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Introduction
The Chinese economy has been experiencing tremen-dous growth since economic reform commencing inthe late 1970s. Agrarian reform has transformed the
rural areas, which were under the shadow of widespread
poverty and disadvantaged by urban-oriented state develop-
ment policies, into the most successful case of combating ex-
treme monetary poverty. (2) As measured by the World
Bank’s (American) dollar-a-day poverty standard based on
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at 1993 international
prices, (3) China’s remarkable increase in per capita income
has fuelled an equally remarkable decrease in the extreme
poverty rate from 74 percent at the beginning of the reform
to 15 percent in 2004; in other words, more than 500 mil-
lion people moved out of poverty. (4) In particular, China has
been praised for meeting the foremost of the Millennium
Development Goals — one of which is to halve the 1990
poverty incidence — 14 years ahead of the 2015 target for
developing countries, and for providing a plausible model for
African countries that have been struggling with poverty. (5)
Aside from these promising anti-poverty outcomes, social
disparity and differentiation, among which inequality and
urban poverty are arguably the most severe, have emerged
as relatively new socio-economic issues in China, which was
once an extremely egalitarian or collectively poor society
under the Mao regime. One of the reasons for the near non-
existence of urban paupers was the ideological dominance of
communism, which discouraged personal income incentives
but guaranteed lifelong employment and substantial fringe
benefits including housing, education, healthcare, and pen-
sions through a danwei-style (work unit) organisational sys-
tem that enclosed the vast majority of urban residents under
the shelter of the state sector. (6) Indeed, in the late 1980s, it
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ABSTRACT: This paper examines poverty and income inequality in urban China by analysing recent survey data
collected in four of the largest Chinese cities (1). Using a number of quantitative measurements, including poverty
indices and Gini coefficients, the paper investigates income poverty and inequality among three groups, namely
urban locals, urban migrants, and rural migrants. The results strongly suggest that urban poverty and inequality are
a serious issue and that rural migrants have become a major segment in the urban poor class. The results are
expected to contribute to the debate on how to improve public policy on poverty alleviation, which currently focuses
only on officially registered urban locals.
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is believed that less than one percent of the urban popula-
tion was classified as poor, and these were mainly the dis-
abled, widowed, and others who were not affiliated with any
danwei, and who were largely looked after by government. (7)
The labour market in making and the urban economy in re-
structuring are the context within which urban poverty and
inequality are emerging. Explicitly advancing returns to edu-
cation and encouraging rural-urban migration, China is a
classic example of what the Nobel Prize economist Arthur
Lewis suggests: “Development must be inegalitarian be-
cause it does not start in every part of the economy at the
same time”; (8) or of Deng Xiaoping’s blunt words: “Let
some people get rich first.” Altering the state-led job assign-
ment system typified by low salaries in the state sector, a
labour market in which people can look for better jobs and
higher pay outside the state sector has been developing since
the late 1970s. It is estimated that the wage returns of one
additional year of schooling increased from 4 percent to 11
percent between 1988 and 2003, progressively concentrat-
ing income distribution among more educated people, (9) al-
though there is mixed evidence as to whether education is
necessarily more highly rewarded in China’s socialist market
economy. (10)
All in all, during the transition from centralised planned
economy to market economy, urban income has been in-
creasing together with growing inequalities and/or deterio-
rating urban poverty, as revealed by a number of studies. (11)
Two sub-populations, among others, are unanimously identi-
fied as the major sources of new urban poor, namely laid-off
workers and rural-urban migrants. (12)
Nationally commenced in 1997 after some trials, the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reform (guoyou qiye gaige) and its
embedded labour retrenchment have radically swelled the
changing social forces. Laid-off workers (xiagang gongren) —
or the new urban underclass (13) — have been created in the
magnitude of hundreds of millions, although the accurate
17N o  2 0 1 0 / 4
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Bank, 1992; Zhiyi Guo, “Pinkun shizhi de lilun renshi yu zhongguo de fan pinkun
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tion Journal), vol. 3, 1996, pp. 3-6.
8. W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Man-
chester School, vol. 22, no. 2, 1954, pp. 139-191.
9. Refer to the work by David Dollar, op. cit.
10. See a number of works in this research area: Ben Jann, “Comment: Earnings Returns to
Education in Urban China: A Note on Testing Differences among Groups,” American So-
ciological Review, vol. 70, no. 5, 2005, pp. 860-864; Haizheng Li, “Economic Transition
and Returns to Education in China,” Economics of Education Review, vol. 22, no. 3,
2003, pp. 317-328; Zhiqiang Liu, “The External Returns to Education: Evidence from
Chinese Cities,” Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 61, no. 3, 2007, pp. 542-564; Xiao-
gang Wu and Yu Xie, “Does the Market Pay Off? Earnings Returns to Education in Urban
China,” American Sociological Review, vol. 68, no. 3, 2003, pp. 425-442.
11. See extensive research in these areas in the following references: Simon Appleton, Lina
Song and Qingjie Xia, “Growing out of Poverty: Trends and Patterns of Urban Poverty in
China 1988-2002,” World Development, vol. 38, no. 5, 2010, pp. 665-678; Sylvie Dé-
murger, Martin Fournier and Li Shi, “Urban Income Inequality in China Revisited (1988-
2002),” Economics Letters, vol. 93, no. 3, 2006, pp. 354-359; Laura Hering and Sandra
Poncet, “Market Access and Individual Wages: Evidence from China,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 92, no. 1, 2010, pp. 145-159; Laura Hering and Sandra
Poncet, “Income Per Capita Inequality in China: The Role of Economic Geography and
Spatial Interactions,” World Economy, vol. 33, no. 5, 2010, pp. 655-679; Shi Li and Hi-
roshi Sato (eds.), Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty in Urban China, New York, Rout-
ledge, 2006; Xubei Luo and Nong Zhu, “Rising Income Inequality in China: A Race to the
Top,” Policy Research Working Paper, no. 4700, 2008; Xin Meng, Robert Gregory and
Guanhua Wan, “Urban Poverty in China and Its Contributing Factors, 1986-2000,” Re-
view of Income and Wealth, vol. 53, no. 1, 2007, pp. 167-189; Xin Meng, Robert Gregory
and Youjuan Wang, “Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Urban China, 1986-2000,” Jour-
nal of Comparative Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, 2005, pp. 710-729; Camelia Minoiu and
Sanjay G. Reddy, “Chinese Poverty: Assessing the Impact of Alternative Assumptions,”
Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 54, no. 4, 2008, pp. 572-596.
12. Generally speaking, the former is disadvantaged by human capital deficit and the latter
by institutional constraints. Refer to Fulong Wu, Chris Webster, Shenjing He, and Yuting
Liu, China’s Urban Poverty, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010.
13. Dorothy J. Solinger, “The Creation of New Underclass in China and Its Implications,” En-
vironment and Urbanization, vol. 18, no. 1, 2006, pp. 177-193.
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Table 1. Migrant workers and employment in urban China
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2001-2009), China Rural Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2001-2009).
Year
Rural migrants (millions)
(1)
Urban employment (millions)
(2)
Ratio (%)
(1) / (2)
2000 78.49 212.74 36.9
2001 83.99 239.40 35.1
2002 104.70 247.80 42.3
2003 113.90 256.39 44.4
2004 118.23 264.76 44.7
2005 125.78 273.31 46.0
2006 132.12 283.10 46.7
2007 136.49 293.50 46.5
2008 145.33 302.10 48.1
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number of this group and the true unemployment rate re-
main a mystery that neither official re-employment nor any
other urban poverty statistics can reliably reveal. (14) Nonethe-
less the urban poor, among whom laid-off/unemployed
workers and their families make up the vast majority (90 per-
cent strong), have reached 23.46 million (in 11.41 million
households) according to a benefit poverty line of 228 yuan
that was equivalent to only around 20 percent of urban mean
income. (15)
In 2000, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) began
gathering information on rural-urban migrants through its
rural household survey. By 2008, the population of rural-
urban migrants had grown to 145 million, approximately 71
percent of whom were concentrated in the more developed
eastern region. They have been continually playing an im-
portant role in the urban labour market, accounting for 48
percent of urban employment and showing a steady increase
over the years (see Table 1). (16) They mainly worked in the
construction, manufacturing, and low-tier service sectors, but
the authorities in most cities have not granted them full
urban citizenship. (17) In fact, they live in a long-standing dual
system that has imposed institutional bias on them through
the hukou (household registration) system. (18) Comparisons
between labour migrants and urban residents empirically and
theoretically reveal that institutional barriers have been deci-
sive factors detrimental to their well-being. (19) As a result,
rural-urban migrants without urban hukou have contributed
to another major group of urban poor.
An income poverty rate of 15.2 percent was estimated for
rural-urban migrants using NBS survey data of 3,600 mi-
grants from 31 cities in 1999, while a poverty rate of 10.3
percent was estimated for local residents using NBS urban
household survey data from the same year. (20) Analysis of
more recent data from the China Income Distribution Sur-
vey in six provinces in 2002 reveals that poverty rates were
3 percent for locals and 6 percent for migrants if defined by
local official benefit poverty lines, or 6 percent for locals and
16 percent for migrants if a higher line was applied. (21) In
these studies, incomes of locals were based on self-recorded
diaries while those of migrants were based on one-off reports
when filling out the questionnaire. The former two studies
excluded zero-income household and the latter excluded
urban migrants who were likely to have higher income. Al-
though the biases tended to be acceptable, these analyses
may have overstated the relative poverty rate of migrants to
locals and underestimated urban-rural income differences. (22)
Even with these research efforts, only the tip of the iceberg
has been revealed in media and research due to the lack of
accuracy and availability of data and limited coverage in ex-
isting literature. For instance, little is known about inter-city
migrants who also hold urban hukou, even though this is also
a sizeable group. (23) Moreover, research is inadequate re-
garding poverty and inequality among various types of mi-
grants and their well-being relative to the other urban resi-
dents.
In an attempt to overcome some of these limitations and to
fill gaps in the current literature, we recently carried out a
study that included three sub-groups. The first group is rural-
urban migrants with rural hukou (rural migrants), the second
group is inter-city migrants with urban hukou from other
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14. John Giles, Albert Park and Juwei Zhang, “What Is China’s True Unemployment Rate?”,
China Economic Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2005, pp. 430-443; John Knight and Jinjun Xue,
“How High Is Urban Unemployment Rate in China?”, Journal of Chinese Economic and
Business Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, 2006, pp. 91-107; Dorothy J. Solinger, “Why We Cannot
Count the ‘Unemployed,’” The China Quarterly, vol. 167, 2001, pp. 671-688.
15. As a practice, the relative poverty line should be equivalent to 40-60 percent of the me-
dian income. It should be noted that this statistic excludes urban residents without
local hukou, or the floating population (liudong renkou) according to the official classi-
fication. See Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2009 Niandu quanguo minzheng shiye fazhan
tongji baogao (Statistical Report for National Civil Affairs, 2009), Beijing, Ministry of
Civil Affairs, 2010.
16. Some other sources report higher estimates depending on operational definitions.
17. There have been some breakthroughs recently. For example, in Chongqing Municipality,
10 million rural residents will be converted to urban hukou by 2020. See Guilin Zhang,
“Chongqing qidong huji gaige: weilai shinian tuidong qianwan nongmin bian shimin”
(Chongqing reforms Hukou: Transforming ten million farmers into urban citizens), re-
trieved on 28 July 2010 from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-07/28/content_1666121.
htm.
18. Kam Wing Chan, “The Chinese Hukou System at 50,” Eurasian Geography and Econom-
ics, vol. 50, no. 2, 2009, pp. 197-221; Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, “The Hukou Sys-
tem and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes,” The China Quarterly,
vol. 160, 1999, pp. 818-855; Fei Guo and Robyn Iredale, “The Impact of Hukou Status
on Migrants’ Employment: Findings from the 1997 Beijing Migrant Census,” Interna-
tional Migration Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2004, pp. 709-731; Zhongwei Zhao and Fei Guo
(eds.), Transition and Challenge: China’s Population at the Beginning of the 21st Century,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
19. Cf. the study by Fei Guo and Wenshu Gao, “What Determines the Welfare and Social Se-
curity Entitlements of Rural Migrants in Chinese Cities?” in Ingrid Nielsen and Russell
Smyth (eds.), Migration and Social Protection in China, Singapore, World Scientific,
2008. Also see John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, “Inequality Change in China and
(Hukou) Labour Mobility Restrictions,” NBER Working Paper no. 10683, 2004; Kevin
Honglin Zhang and Shunfeng Song, “Rural-Urban Migration and Urbanization in China:
Evidence from Time-Series and Cross-Section Analyses,” China Economic Review, vol.
14, no. 4, 2003, pp. 386-400.
20. Cf. the following research: Asian Development Bank, Poverty Profile of the People’s Re-
public of China, Manila, Asian Development Bank, 2004; Athar Hussain, Urban Poverty in
China: Measurement, Patterns and Policies, Geneva, International Labour Office, 2003.
21. Yang Du, Robert Gregory, and Xin Meng, “The Impact of the Guest-Worker System on
Poverty and the Well-Being of Migrant Workers in Urban China,” in Ligang Song (ed.),
The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development, Canberra, Asia Pacific Press, 2006.
22. Albert Park and Dewen Wang, “Migration and Urban Poverty and Inequality in China,”
China Economic Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, 2010, pp. 49-67.
23. Recently, particular attention has been given to college graduates who move to or stay
in large cities after graduation. See Si Lian (ed.), Yizu: Daxue biyesheng jujucun shilu
(Ant tribe: A study of college graduate villages), Nanning, Guangxi shifan daxue chuban-
she (Guangxi Normal University Press), 2009. Also refer to C. Cindy Fan, “The Elite, the
Natives, and the Outsiders: Migration and Labor Market Segmentation in Urban China,”
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 92, no. 1, 2002, pp. 103-124.
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Labour Market Disparity, Poverty, and Inequality in Urban China
cities (urban migrants), and the last group is local residents
with local urban hukou (urban locals). (24) As indicated in the
previous section, studies on China’s internal migration tend
to focus on rural-to-urban migrants, given that they make up
the majority of the migrant population, they have been dis-
advantaged by public policies, and they have suffered insti-
tutional discrimination for more than five decades. However,
the literature has taken very little note of inter-city or urban-
to-urban migrants. By introducing urban-to-urban migrants,
this study hopes to contribute to the understanding of the
role of the household registration system (hukou) in deter-
mining people’s well-being. By contrasting rural-to-urban mi-
grants with urban-to-urban migrants, we hope to better un-
derstand how two types of hukou dichotomy (i.e. rural vs.
urban hukou and local vs. non-local hukou) affect people’s
well-being.
Urban poverty and inequality and their interweaving with
political, economic, and social factors form a complex topic,
especially in transitional China. Rather than attempting an
exhaustive examination of these issues, we aim to offer a la-
conic analysis on the most recent data available to depict a
rapidly changing urban China and to extend our focus to
some less developed research areas. The next section intro-
duces the data and methodology we employed and provides
some descriptive statistics. Before proceeding to the fourth
section on the measurement of poverty and inequality, the
third section examines the labour market performances of
the three population groups in our study. The last section
then presents some concluding remarks.Background,  data and methodology
This study was funded by an Australian Research Council
Discovery project entitled Migrant Labour in Large Chinese
Cities, through which the data was collected in 2008 in col-
laboration with local research institutions and universities in
four Chinese megacities, including the municipalities of Bei-
jing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and Guangzhou, the capital of
Guangdong Province. Beijing and Tianjin are neighbouring
19N o  2 0 1 0 / 4
24. A migrant is generally defined as a person working outside his or her place of hukou
registration. In Chinese government statistics and documents, the Chinese term nong-
min gong is used for rural-urban migrants.
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Table 2. Information on studied cities (1)
Notes: 1. Statistics reported here are for local urban hukou only; 2. Chinese authorities do not report sampling unemployment rate. 
3. MLSS is the abbreviation for the Minimum Living Standard Scheme.
Sources: Authors’ calculation and statistics from China Statistical Yearbook 2009 (NBS, 2009), Urban Minimum Living Standard Scheme 
Report 2008 (MCA, 2009), Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook 2009 (GBS, 2009), Beijing Statistical Report 2008 (BBS, 2009), Shanghai Statistical
Report 2008 (SBS, 2009) and Tianjin Statistical Report 2008 (TBS, 2009).
National Beijing Tianjin Shanghai Guangzhou
Urban population (millions) 606.67 14.39 9.08 12.17 7.84
GDP (billion yuan) 30,067 1,048 635 1,370 822
GDP per capita (yuan) 22,698 63,029 55,473 73,124 81,233
GDP growth rate (percentage/year) 9.0 9.0 16.0 9.7 12.3
Disposable income per capita
(yuan/year)
15,780 24,725 19,423 26,675 25,317
Consumption per capita (yuan/year) 11,243 16,460 13,422 19,398 20,836
Mean wage (yuan/year) 29,229 56,328 41,748 56,565 45,365
Self-registered unemployment (2)
(percentage)
4.2 1.8 3.6 4.2 2.3
MLSS poverty relief recipients (3) 23,347,864 145,075 156,305 340,797 45,000
MLSS coverage (percentage) 3.85 1.01 1.72 2.80 0.57
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cities located in Northern China; Shanghai is situated in the
Yangtze River Delta on the east coast; Guangzhou is a
coastal city in southern China’s Pearl River Delta. These
cities are long-standing economic powerhouses and political
and economic centres in these three most developed regions
of China. They represent the so-called China miracle of the
last three decades, as evidenced by their rapid urbanisation
incurred by massive population inflow, double-digit annual
GDP growth, and so forth (see Table 2). For example,
Guangdong’s GDP recently overtook that of Saudi Arabia,
Argentina, and South Africa and would rank sixteenth if
classified as one of the G20 economies. The per capita
GDP of all these cities has approached or already overtaken
the lower-tier economies in the G20 league. (25)
A stratified random sampling method was used to collect
representative data. In each city, one urban and one subur-
ban district were randomly selected, and then two neigh-
bourhoods (juweihui) were randomly picked from each dis-
trict. One hundred randomly selected households in each se-
lected neighbourhood were interviewed with the aid of ques-
tionnaires to collect both individual and household data. In-
formation collected in the survey relevant to economic well-
being and poverty includes household income, expenditure,
and savings, as well as individual family members’ employ-
ment status and income, welfare entitlements, social security
benefits, etc. The survey collected 1,797 valid question-
naires comprising 399 urban locals, 381 urban-to-urban mi-
grants, and 1,017 rural-to-urban migrants, which made up
22, 21, and 57 percent of the sample, respectively (see
Table 3 for details). (26)
To estimate the poverty trends and to investigate how social
and economic changes have impacted the urban subgroups,
Foster-Greer-Thorbeck (FGT) measures were used to pro-
vide more decomposable information than a conventional
headcount-only poverty index could do: (27)
where i represents the i th individual among N  individuals;
Gi is the poverty gap between the monetary poverty line (z)
and income per capita of the ith individual’s household (xi),
expressed as Gi = z-xi (with Gi = 0 when xi > z); is an eth-
ical parameter equal to or greater than zero. When = 0, the
equation stands for the poverty headcount ratio (P0, i.e. the
fraction of the population below the poverty line); when = 1,
it represents the poverty gap (P1, i.e., the intensity of
poverty) as the percentage of the poverty line, taking into ac-
count the total shortfall of individual income below a certain
poverty standard; when = 2, it estimates an index of the
weighted poverty gap, namely poverty severity (P2). In this
paper, we use FGT indices for measuring overall as well as
subgroup poverty across cities and hukou status.
Three major types of poverty and income thresholds are
used in this study. First, we use the official income thresh-
old according to the Minimum Living Standard Scheme
(MLSS, or dibao in Chinese), a monthly transfer program
designed to provide relief to urban poor with local urban
hukou. An eligible MLSS recipient receives a relief transfer
payment equivalent to the gap between the household in-
come per capita as estimated by governmental agency (e.g.
neighbourhood committee) and the local MLSS benefit
poverty line. In 2008, the national mean MLSS benefit line
was 205 yuan per month and the MLSS lines in these cities
20 N o  2 0 1 0 / 4
25. Jianping Li, Minrong Li, and Yanjing Gao (eds.), Zhongguo shengyu jingji zonghe
jingzhengli fazhan baogao, 2008-2009 (Annual report on overall competitiveness of
China’s provincial economies, 2008-2009), Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press,
2010.
26. The survey asked interviewees directly about the types of their hukou.
27. James Foster, Joel Greer, and Erik Thorbecke, “A Class of Decomposable Poverty Meas-
ures,” Econometrica, vol. 52, no. 3, 1984, pp. 761-766.
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Table 3. Survey sample distribution in cities and by groups
Urban locals Urban migrants Rural migrants Subtotal (%)
Beijing 112 151 197 460 (26%)
Tianjin 59 62 375 496 (27%)
Shanghai 70 48 281 399 (22%)
Guangzhou 158 120 164 442 (25%)
Subtotal (%) 399 (22%) 381 (21%) 1,017 (57%) 1,797 (100%)
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
α 
α 
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were 330 yuan for Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangzhou and
350 yuan for Shanghai. A higher MLSS line of 350 yuan
per month is applied in this study for simplicity and because
the MLSS standards have been considered too low in these
cities. The bottom two rows in Table 2 show that the over-
all coverage of MLSS in China was 3.85 percent while the
coverage of MLSS in our sample cities was extremely low
(ranging between 0.57 and 2.8 percent), although these
cities had the highest MLSS lines compared with other re-
gions and cities. It means that the official relief program
could only provide very limited help to a small proportion of
poor who were under the specified benefit poverty lines in
the studied cities. This is not to deny the effort the Chinese
government has made to improve the MLSS in terms of
poverty lines and poverty targeting, although some scholars
have criticised the program as a passive response to the so-
cial externalities of market reform. (28) As of June 2010,
among these four cities, Shanghai has the highest MLSS
line (450 yuan), followed by Tianjin (430 yuan), Beijing,
and Guangzhou (both 410 yuan). (29) In other words, the
poverty standard has increased by approximately one fifth in
absolute terms since the year of our survey. The MLSS lines
in these cities are also among the highest nationally. Since
local urban hukou are essential for eligibility, urban-to-urban
and rural-to-urban migrants are excluded as beneficiaries of
the program. We therefore apply the same standards to
these two institutionally excluded groups, as they are equally
disadvantaged in urban MLSS program. 
Second, we used two other poverty lines based on the World
Bank’s $1/day poverty standard (or more precisely
$1.25/day after several revisions since its introduction),
which has been widely used to evaluate and compare
poverty internationally. The $1.25/day line is approximately
equivalent to 150 yuan per month in PPP terms in 2008.
Considering that the standard of living in these cities is
among the highest in China, this poverty line is obviously in-
appropriate in our study setting, not to mention that it is even
lower than the MLSS line. As an amendment, we followed
the example of some other studies by setting two higher
lines, one 2.5 times higher than the $1.25/day standard and
the other three times higher. Their monthly poverty lines
(hereafter WB1 and WB2) in Chinese currency are 450
and 600 yuan respectively, the latter of which is about 42
percent of the urban mean income.
In the absence of national median income per capita — a
more meaningful reference to test income distribution —
national income per capita is used as the third income
threshold. According to official statistics, the monthly in-
come per capita for a migrant working in the eastern region
was 1,422 yuan in 2009, which is at the same level as the
national monthly income per capita in 2008. Therefore the
third income threshold we imported to the FGT approach
was national monthly income per capita (i.e. 1,422
yuan/month) as a reference for the other two types of
poverty lines for the purpose of revealing income distribu-
tion at a higher standard within our samples. Relying on
these poverty and income thresholds, the disposable fea-
tures of FGT indices allow us to measure and compare
poverty and income level in different groups and to exam-
ine how poverty changes in response to the increase of
poverty lines. (30)
We also examined inequality through two traditional and re-
vealing approaches. The Gini is a synthetic index that com-
presses all information about inequality into a value between
zero and one. The Gini coefficient is calculated as:
where y is income. A result of zero expresses perfect equal-
ity and a value of one expresses maximal inequality in in-
come distribution. We then used the Gini coefficient to plot
a Lorenz curve to visually represent income inequality. The
further the Lorenz curve lies below the 45-degree line rep-
resenting perfect equality, the more unequal is the distribu-
tion of income.Labour  market  di spar it i es
Although competition between migrants and locals has been
observed, research indicates increasing segmentation of the
labour market. (31) In light of these views, this section exam-
ines some important aspects of the labour market in the se-
lected cities. It was found that urban locals still have strong
advantages in terms of job searching channels compared to
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28. Dorothy J. Solinger, “The Dibao Recipients: Mollified Anti-Emblem of Urban Moderniza-
tion,” China Perspectives, no. 4, 2008, pp. 36-46.
29. Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Minimum Living Standards in 36 Central Cities as of June
2010,” 2010, retrieved on 8 August 2010 from http://www.dibao.org/content.
aspx?lid=1820&type=tj02.
30. Nowadays poverty is recognised as a multidimensional phenomenon; therefore the
poverty line alone cannot fully reveal poverty as a complex multifaceted occurrence.
This paper adopts poverty lines neither for the purposes of defining nor of counting the
poor as a standard, but to compare the poverty indices under different income poverty
thresholds and to collate the sensitivity of these thresholds. Although income poverty
alone may not be an exhaustive indicator of living conditions, as low-income households
may spend either less or more than they earn, it still has important implications in mak-
ing and implementing policies as a more convenient and straightforward approach than
others.
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the other two groups (see Table 4). One-fifth of urban lo-
cals were assigned to jobs by their local governments and
nearly one-fourth got jobs from employer recruitment fairs,
while only 15 percent needed to search for jobs on their
own. A large proportion of rural migrants, however, went to
their destination cities relying either totally on their own abil-
ities or on existing social networks (often kinship or friend-
ship) for job recommendation and information on recruit-
ment opportunities. Compared with urban hukou holders,
rural migrants’ job searches fell back on two main channels:
asking help from their friends and relatives via their con-
strained social networks in cities (41 percent) and looking
for jobs on their own (30 percent). A very small proportion
of rural migrants got jobs through employer job fairs or di-
rect recruitment. Compared to rural migrants, migrants from
other cities (urban migrants) have more diversified job
searching methods: a smaller proportion of urban migrants
got their jobs through friends or relatives and a higher pro-
portion (than rural migrants) did so through response to job
openings and employers’ direct recruitment. 
The different ways of obtaining jobs by these three distinct
population groups in China’s large cities clearly suggest that
the legacy of China’s long-term institutional mechanism, the
hukou, is still effective in determining access to public sup-
port and social capital in the job market. It seems clear that
government assistance in job searches is mainly available to
those who are able to transfer their hukou to the city of des-
tination. Those who are not locally registered but come from
other urban areas are more likely to be hired through recruit-
ment fairs or by responding to recruitment advertisements, as
they are more likely to be better educated and tend to be
more competitive. It is perhaps not unexpected that the ma-
jority of rural migrants have to rely on their own abilities or
personal relationships to land a job in these large cities. It by
no means suggests, however, that rural migrants are more
competitive in the job market in these large cities. Rather, it
may imply the informal nature of the jobs they are more
likely to land. The analysis in the next section on the type of
employment might offer some further explanation.
On the one hand, there is no unanimous academic and offi-
cial agreement on the definitions for the informal sector and
informal employment in China. The Chinese government,
on the other hand, has been encouraging the development
of the informal sector and informal employment that is typi-
fied by less supervised small business activities and a largely
unstable short-term or uncontracted labour relationship. It is
estimated that the number of informal employees has
reached 136 million and that they contribute 35 percent of
GDP. (32) For the sake of simplicity, this paper defines the in-
formal sector as a concept relative to the more regulated and
supervised sector in the socialist market economy. In this
sense, governmental departments and related institutions
(e.g. schools, public transport companies, etc.), post-reform
state- and collective-owned, foreign-funded, and joint-venture
enterprises are more likely to provide employees with formal
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31. See John Knight and Lina Song, Towards a Labour Market in China, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005; John Knight and Linda Yueh, “Job Mobility of Residents and Mi-
grants in Urban China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 32, no. 4, 2004, pp. 637-
660; John Knight and Linda Yueh, “Segmentation or Competition in China’s Urban
Labour Market?”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 1, 2009, pp. 79-94.
32. Yun Ren and Xizhe Peng (eds.), 2006 Nian Zhongguo feizhenggui jiuye fazhan baogao
(Report on China’s Informal Employment, 2006), Chongqing, Chongqing Press, 2007.
Job searching
Cases Percent Cases Percent Cases Percent
Government assignment 82 20.9 4 1.1 13 1.3
Private employment agency 6 1.5 16 4.3 51 5.1
Government employment agency 19 4.8 11 2.9 18 1.8
Friend/relative’s recommendation 84 21.6 102 27.3 417 41.4
Job searching on one’s own 60 15.3 96 25.7 302 30.0
Response to job advertisement 23 5.9 46 12.3 33 3.3
Employer’s job fair/recruitment 93 23.7 64 17.1 92 9.1
Other 25 6.4 35 9.4 81 8.0
Total 393 100 374 100 1,007 100
Table 4. Distribution of job searching channels by three groups
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
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and legitimate contracts and benefits (e.g., employer contri-
butions to pensions and to medical and unemployment insur-
ance) than are small-scale joint-ventures and private enter-
prises and small private businesses (getihu). Table 5 pres-
ents the types of employers the sampled respondents worked
for. Compared with the other two groups, rural migrants
were more concentrated in the informal sector, whilst urban
locals were more concentrated in the formal sector. Among
rural migrants, 23 percent worked in private enterprises, 20
percent in getihu, and 6 percent were self-employed. The sit-
uation of urban migrants is somewhere between that of
urban locals and rural migrants. A significantly larger propor-
tion of urban locals than other groups worked in government
and related institutions (32 percent), state-owned enterprises
(18 percent), and collective-owned enterprises (8 percent),
and a lower proportion in joint-ventures, private enterprises,
and small private businesses. Urban migrants also tended to
be concentrated in the informal sector, although at a lower
proportion than rural migrants. Further analysis finds signif-
icant disparities also exist in terms of the major types of busi-
nesses the different groups worked for. Approximately 53
percent of rural migrants worked for employers in the areas
of sales, catering, logistics, marketing, storage, and manufac-
turing, and a very small proportion of them were employed
in the areas of education, entertainment, arts, technical serv-
ices, finance, banking, and so on — urban migrants had ad-
vantages over rural migrants in these areas thanks to gener-
ally better social capital. Not surprisingly, 32 percent of
urban locals worked in government departments, as 21 per-
cent were assigned jobs by the local government, while less
than 2 percent of migrants held such positions. Although the
survey did not directly collect unemployment data following
the first job, job security is obviously less an issue for locals
than for both types of migrants, as revealed by the former’s
lower unemployment rate and shorter unemployment (if
any) overall in the last year.
Table 6 shows the percentage distribution of the size of en-
terprise/organisation in which respondents were employed.
Nearly half of rural migrants were employed by small em-
ployers with fewer than 10 employees, and a quarter of them
worked for employers with 11 to 50 staff. (33) In terms of the
types and length of labour contracts (if any) and the occupa-
tions among our samples, we found that more than three-
fourths of urban locals and nearly 58 percent of urban mi-
grants had signed contracts with their employers (see Table
7). However, 63 percent of rural migrants had not signed
any form of contract. In terms of fixed term contracts, a
higher proportion of urban locals had signed relatively long-
period fixed-term contracts of two to five or over five years.
One-fifth of urban locals had signed continuing contracts,
while only 6.5 to 8.4 percent of migrants had obtained such
contracts. Although a small number of migrants worked in
governmental institutions (refer to Table 5), most of them
were under short-term contracts and worked as cleaners,
typists, gardeners, security guards, and so on. For rural mi-
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Types of employers
Cases Percent Cases Percent Cases Percent
Government and related institutions (1) 126 32.1 32 8.6 48 4.8
State-owned enterprise 72 18.4 29 7.8 53 5.3
Collective-owned enterprise 33 8.4 20 5.3 42 4.2
Foreign-funded enterprise 25 6.4 37 9.9 84 8.3
Joint venture enterprise 64 16.3 126 33.7 289 28.7
Private business 17 4.3 56 15.0 233 23.1
Small private business (getihu) (2) 33 8.4 58 15.5 203 20.1
Self-employed 22 5.6 16 4.3 56 5.6
Total 392 100 374 100 1008 100
Table 5. Distribution of types of employers by three groups
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
Notes: 1. This category includes public service institutions (shiye danwei), educational institutions (da, zhong, xiao xue) and research institu-
tions (yanjiu danwei); 2. Getihu is a small private business of which the ownership is limited to members of a family and which can employ a
small number of non-family employees.
Urban locals Urban migrants Rural migrants
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grants, common occupations were service staff — e.g. restau-
rant waiter/waitress — (42 percent), cleaners and salesper-
sons, and industrial workers (23 percent); for urban mi-
grants, the main jobs were service staff (41 percent), tech-
nician (23 percent), and office clerk (13 percent); for urban
locals, the main jobs were official clerk (23 percent), serv-
ice staff (21 percent), and technician (14 percent). 
In sum, urban locals, urban migrants, and rural migrants
present different labour market patterns in terms of their ap-
proaches to the job market, their employment sectors, and
the scale of their employers. The next section extends the
examination to income poverty and inequality, which are
among the most direct outcomes of these different patterns
in the emerging labour market in China.
Urban poverty  and inequali ty
The standard of living in China has been improved steadily
over the past three decades or so. Official statistics show
that the Engel’s coefficients — a percentage measure of the
amount of food expenditure relative to the amount of in-
come — of urban and rural households decreased in similar
downward trends from 58 to 37 percent and from 67 to 43
percent, respectively, between 1978 and 2008 (Figure 1).
During the same period, income increases in percentage
terms were dramatic, as both urban and rural annual in-
comes per capita expanded almost nine times between
1978 and 2008 (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the rural-urban in-
come gap has been growing since 1997 after some improve-
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Number of employees
Cases Percent Cases Percent Cases Percent
Up to 10 71 18.3 123 33.2 464 46.9
11-50 114 29.3 86 23.2 234 23.7
51-300 108 27.8 87 23.5 159 16.1
301-1,000 49 12.6 48 13.0 82 8.3
Above 1,000 47 12.1 26 7.0 50 5.1
Total 389 100 370 100 989 100
Table 6. Distribution of size of employers by three groups
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
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Cases Percent Cases Percent Cases Percent
With contract 303 77.9 214 57.7 367 37.1
Without contract 86 22.1 157 42.3 621 62.9
Total 389 100 371 100 988 100
With contract
Continuing contract 66 21.8 14 6.5 31 8.4
Fixed-term contract 237 78.2 200 93.5 336 91.6
Total 303 100 214 100 367 100
Fixed-term contract
Up to 0.5 year 15 6.3 13 6.5 38 11.3
0.5-1 year 106 44.7 111 55.5 213 63.4
2-5 years 94 39.7 62 31.0 77 22.9
More than 5 years 22 9.3 14 7.0 8 2.4
Total 237 100 200 100 336 100
Table 7. Distribution of types and lengths of contract signed by three groups
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
Urban locals Urban migrants Rural migrants
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ments in narrowing their gap in the 1980s and early 1990s,
reflecting the shift of economic policy priorities from the
rural to urban areas and from agricultural to export-oriented
economies in the last three decades (Figure 3). Actually,
research has found that China’s rural-urban income gap is
much larger than in most other developing economies, (34)
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Figure 1. Engel’s coefficients of urban and rural households (percent)
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2009).
Figure 2. Relative index of annual income per capita in urban and rural area 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2009); Note: 1978 as the base year and as 100.
34. Robert Eastwood and Michael Lipton, “Rural and Urban Income Inequality and Poverty:
Does Convergence between Sectors Offset Divergence within Them?”, in Giaovanni An-
drea Cornia (ed.), Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Global-
ization, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; John Knight, Shi Li, and Lina Song, “The
Rural-Urban Divide and the Evolution of Political Economy in China,” in James Boyce,
Stephen Cullenberg, and Prasanta Pattanaik (eds.), Human Development in the Era of
Globalization: Essays in Honor of Keith B. Griffin, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2006; Al-
bert Park, “Rural-Urban Inequality in China,” in Shahid Yusuf and Tony Saich (eds.), China
Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies, Washington, The World Bank, 2008.
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and it has often been underestimated. As pointed out in the
National Human Development Report for China, “If pub-
lic housing subsidies, private housing imputed rent, pension,
free medical care, and educational subsidises were in-
cluded,… [it would bring] the urban-rural income ratio to
about four-fold instead of the 3.2-fold acknowledged by offi-
cial figures.” (35) Such rural-urban differences not only con-
tribute to overall social inequality but also create strong incen-
tives for internal migration through rising living costs and the
prevalence of consumerism, although discriminatory measures
persist against migrants, who are still often relegated to sec-
ond-class status. (36)
Decomposing poverty, Table 8 presents overall and grouped
poverty measures of the sampled population by using the
MLSS line, two revised World Bank lines (WB1 and
WB2), and the urban monthly income per capita as ex-
plained in the methodology section. It gives an idea of the
level of poverty in these cities and among the three groups
according to various standards of measurement. Using the
MLSS line, the overall poverty rate among our sampled pop-
ulation in all four cities was 6.2 percent, with poverty gap
and severity indices of 2.3 and 1.5 percent. Between the
MLSS and WB lines, poverty indices increased signifi-
cantly. For instance, increasing the WB1 by one third to
WB2 increased the poverty rate by 7.8 percent — a nearly
80 percent change. More than half of the sample did not
reach the mean income, with a significant poverty gap and
severity. Our sample population in Tianjin had the highest
poverty rates under all standards, followed by Guangzhou,
Beijing, and Shanghai. However, the other two poverty in-
dices provided more complex information. For instance,
using the MLSS line, Guangzhou’s poverty gap and sever-
ity were the highest among the four cities. Shanghai per-
formed the best in all poverty indices under all standards. In
particular, its overall poverty rates were only around one per-
cent under both the MLSS and WB1 lines, significantly bet-
ter than other cities in terms of extreme poverty rates.
The table also presents poverty indices according to hukou
status. In the four cities, poverty indices among rural migrants
were much higher than in the other groups, no matter which
poverty line was applied. It is clear that the higher the stan-
dard of poverty line, the larger the difference in poverty in-
dices between rural migrants and the other two groups. Not
surprisingly, rural migrants contributed more to urban poverty
than the other two groups. It is very interesting to note, how-
ever, that the differences in the poverty rate, gap, and sever-
ity indices between urban locals and urban migrants were not
significant (mostly 0.1 to 0.3 percent), indicating that local
hukou status may not be an overwhelmingly important factor
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35. United Nations Development Programme, The National Human Development Report for
China, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p. 27. 
36. On the eve of the 2010 National People’s Congress, 13 newspapers published an edito-
rial calling for the abolition to the hukou system. The Chinese authorities quickly sup-
pressed the editorial, and some editors lost their jobs.
Figure 3. Ratio of rural to urban annual income per capita, 1978-2008 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2009).
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in predicting poverty among these two groups of samples. (37)
Migrants from other urban areas also performed about as well
as locals in terms of income. It is the nature of the hukou,
being a rural hukou or urban hukou holder, that makes a dif-
ference in the economic wellbeing of the group as a whole.
This finding makes an interesting contrast with some recent
studies on wage and employment entitlements and benefits
among China’s migrants, which were based on data col-
lected in five Chinese cities. (38) The multivariate analyses at
the individual level in these studies indicate that the major
disparity between local workers and migrant workers is not
the wage difference, but rather that access to welfare and so-
cial security benefits and employment-related entitlements
contribute to the widening gap between local workers and
migrant workers. At the individual level, being a local worker
does not necessarily enable one to earn a higher wage; the
higher income earned by local workers resulted from access
to professional and other more prestigious jobs. The two re-
cent studies also found that hukou status was not significant
in explaining wage gaps; educational attainment seems to
play a greater role in one’s level of income. The findings
from the present paper, however, suggest that rural migrants
as a group suffer more severe poverty compared with locals
and migrants from other urban areas. This seemingly contra-
dictory finding may suggest that even though at the individ-
ual level, all other factors being equal, rural migrants can at-
tain income more or less equal to that of their local or urban
migrant counterparts, they are still the most disadvantaged
group in large Chinese cities in terms of monetary poverty.
This is precisely because the lack of competitive human cap-
ital among rural migrants, such as educational attainment
and vocational training, contributes to their lack of competi-
tiveness in the labour market, causing them to suffer greater
poverty. As indicated above, rural migrants were the main
group of urban poor in large Chinese cities. The existing
poverty relief program aimed at providing a minimum living
allowance to locally registered urban poor has only been able
to cover a very small proportion of the impoverished urban
population, as stated in the background section. 
Along with the emergence of urban poverty, disparities be-
tween urban and rural areas and within urban areas have in-
creased dramatically. Nationally, China’s income Gini coeffi-
cient has grown from 0.3 in 1978 to 0.45 in 2002; in partic-
ular, China reports the highest consumption Gini coefficient
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37. Given the sample size and unavailability of statistics relating to the migrant population
at the city level, we could not safely conclude that the difference of poverty indices be-
tween urban locals and urban migrants was comparatively insignificant at the popula-
tion level. Nonetheless, as the survey followed a strictly representative sampling, the re-
sults are meaningful.
38. Survey data in these studies were collected in five Chinese cities (Beijing, Shijiazhuang,
Shenyang, Wuxi, and Dongguan) between 2003 and 2005 through a project supported
by the Ford Foundation. See the following two papers for details: Fei Guo and Wenshu
Gao, “The Legacy of Socialist Dualism: Rural Migrants’ Employment Status and Social
Security Entitlements in Chinese Cities,” The Proceeding of International Workshop of
Migration and Social Protection in China, Beijing, 2007; Fei Guo and Wenshu Gao, “What
Determines the Welfare and Social Security Entitlements of Rural Migrants in Chinese
Cities?”, op. cit.
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P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2 P0 P1 P2
Overall 0.062 0.023 0.015 0.098 0.035 0.020 0.175 0.060 0.032 0.544 0.248 0.141
Beijing 0.046 0.018 0.012 0.057 0.025 0.016 0.124 0.040 0.023 0.478 0.209 0.113
Shanghai 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.070 0.014 0.007 0.484 0.177 0.082
Tianjin 0.107 0.028 0.014 0.190 0.055 0.025 0.325 0.105 0.049 0.778 0.396 0.236
Guangzhou 0.077 0.037 0.028 0.113 0.050 0.034 0.156 0.072 0.046 0.403 0.188 0.119
Urban locals 0.050 0.025 0.021 0.063 0.032 0.024 0.113 0.045 0.030 0.474 0.197 0.109
Urban migrants 0.052 0.024 0.018 0.079 0.034 0.023 0.113 0.049 0.031 0.417 0.194 0.112
Rural migrants 0.071 0.021 0.011 0.119 0.038 0.018 0.223 0.070 0.034 0.619 0.296 0.171
Table 8. Poverty indices by cities and hukou status
Notes: 1. Authors’ calculation. 2. In 2008, the mean income in urban China was 17,067 yuan per year, or 1,422 yuan per month (NBS, 2000-
2009). Chinese authorities do not report median income. It is reasonable to assume that poverty indices will shoot up if measured by the inter-
nationally prevailing poverty standard of 40-60% of median income.
P0 – Poverty rate indices, P1 – Poverty gap indices, P2 – Poverty severity indices.
MLSS WB1 WB2 Mean income
By cities
By hukou status
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in Asia. (39) In one of the few earlier studies of inequality
among rural-urban migrants, larger nationwide inequality was
found among migrant households than between rural and
urban households in 2002. (40) There has been criticism that
some estimations report Gini coefficients that are signifi-
cantly lower than people’s perceptions; for example, a report
estimates the coefficients as 0.22 in Beijing in 2002 and 0.32
in Shanghai between 2004 and 2005. These figures indicate
good overall equality, and they were among the lowest of the
world’s largest cities in the early and mid 2000s. (41) In fact,
there have been many debates on Gini coefficient estimation
methods and results. The Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development recently suggested a slightly de-
creased Gini index from 0.41 in 2005 to 0.408 in 2007. (42)
However, some believe that China’s Gini index, which has
been steadily rising after exceeding the national warning level
of 0.4 a decade ago, is now higher than 0.5. (43)
To test whether these assumptions and estimations are appli-
cable to our samples, we examine in this section overall and
grouped distribution of income by utilising the Gini coeffi-
cient and Lorenz curve, both of which are measures of so-
cial inequality in terms of monetary standards. Figure 4 pres-
ents Gini coefficients by hukou status. The overall Gini co-
efficient of four cities and all three groups is 0.50. Urban mi-
grants have the highest Gini coefficient (0.54), reflecting
the population diversity in this group. As shown in Table 5,
a large proportion of urban migrants worked in the formal
sector, including foreign and joint-venture enterprises, as well
as in the public sector. Migrants from other urban areas
would normally also include highly-educated college gradu-
ates who for some reasons are unable to transfer their hukou
registration to the places of their current residence.
Nonetheless, urban migrants would also include those who
come to large cities to engage in low-skilled jobs if their
places of origin could not provide opportunities for them. (44)
This diversity within the urban migrant group contributes to
the greater Gini coefficient, therefore greater inequality,
among this group. Urban locals have more or less the same
level of inequality as urban migrants, as indicated by a Gini
coefficient of 0.52. This value is even higher than the over-
all national Gini coefficient in 2002, which takes into con-
sideration rural/urban inequality. The high Gini coefficient
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39. Tann vom Hove, “China’s Urban Transition Causes Growing Inequality,” 2008, retrieved
on 1 July 2010 from http://www.citymayors.com/habitat/habitat08-china.html.
40. Azizur Rahman Khan and Carl Riskin, “Growth and Distribution of Household Income in
China between 1995 and 2002,” in Björn A. Gustafsson, Shi Li, and Terry Sicular (eds.),
Inequality and Public Policy in China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
41. United Nations-Habitat, State of the World’s Cities, 2008/2009, Nairobi, United Nations
Human Settlements Programme, 2008. This report uses official statistics to reach its
conclusion on the case of Chinese cities.
42. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Economic Survey of China
2010, Paris, OECD Headquarter, 2010.
43. Yaping Cong and Changjiu Li, Shouru fenpei shiheng dailai jingji shehui fengxian (Four
aspects of income distribution inequality raise socio-economic risks), Beijing, Jingji
cankao (Economic Information), 21 May 2010.
44. This is particularly the case in large cities. See, among others, C. Cindy Fan, “Economic Op-
portunities and Internal Migration: A Case Study of Guangdong Province, China,” The Profes-
sional Geographer, vol. 48, no. 1, 2006, pp. 28-45; Si-Ming Li and Yat-Ming Siu, “A Compar-
ative Study of Permanent and Temporary Migration in China: the Case of Dongguan and
Meizhou, Guangdong Province,” International Journal of Population Geography, vol. 3, no. 1,
1997, pp. 63-82; Alice Goldstein and Shenyang Guo, “Temporary Migration in Shanghai and
Beijing,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 27, no. 2, 1992, pp. 39-56.
Figure 4. Gini coefficients by hukou status 
Overall 0.50
Urban locals 0.52
Urban migrants 0.54
0.43Rural migrants
Source: Authors’ data and calculation.
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among urban locals in our studied cities offers a different
angle for examining inequality in China. It seems that eco-
nomic inequality exists not only between the rural and urban
areas, but also within China’s large cities and among urban
locals. Among the three groups, rural migrants have the low-
est Gini coefficient (0.43), meaning lower inequality within
the group. This is an interesting but not surprising finding.
Rural migrants as a group are perhaps more homogenous
than urban migrants and urban locals. The common charac-
teristics of rural migrants have been well documented in a
number of previous studies. (45) Some common characteristics
of rural migrants include young, junior/high school edu-
cated, and engaging in low-skilled or semi-skilled jobs in
cities. One key common feature also includes the likelihood
that they will be treated as second-class citizens in Chinese
cities. The relatively low Gini coefficient among rural mi-
grants indicates relatively low inequality, but this does not
necessarily imply a positive result. Taking the results of
poverty rates and poverty gaps into consideration (see Table
8), one can only conclude that the relatively low Gini coef-
ficient implies that rural migrants as a group are relatively
equal at the bottom of the income spectrum. 
These findings can be further illustrated by drawing Lorenz
curves for visualising inequality among the three hukou
groups (see Figures 5). The more the curve bends away
from the 45-degree perfect equity line, the higher the in-
equality. If we divide the samples according to their hukou
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45. Cf. Kenneth Roberts, “The Changing Profile of Labour Migration,” in Zhongwei Zhao and
Fei Guo (eds.), Transition and Challenge: China’s Population at the Beginning of the 21st
Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007; Fei Guo and Robyn Iredale, “The Impact
of Hukou Status on Migrants’ Employment: Findings from the 1997 Beijing Migrant Cen-
sus,” International Migration Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2004, pp. 709-731; Feng Wang,
“Gendered Migration and the Migration of Genders in Contemporary China,” in Gail E.
Henderson and Barbara Entwisle (eds.), Re-Drawing Boundaries: Work, Households, and
Gender in China, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000; Feng Wang and Anan
Shen, “Double Jeopardy? Female Rural Migrant Labourers in Urban China: The Case of
Shanghai,” in Richard Anker Brígida García, Antonella Pinnelli (eds.), Women in the
Labour Market in Changing Economies: Demographic Issues, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003.
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Figure 5. Lorenz curves by hukou status
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status, the curve for rural migrants is the only curve above the
overall Lorenz curve, whilst the curves for urban locals and
migrants are both below the overall curve (see Figure 5).
The Lorenz curves provide more or less the same patterns of
income inequality within the three groups. There is a greater
degree of income inequality within the urban migrant group,
which is slightly greater than that of urban locals. Rural mi-
grants are a relatively egalitarian group in terms of income.
However, it is worth noting that urban locals have exclusive
access to a variety of public services that are largely unavail-
able to migrants. For example, the income of urban residents
cannot fully reflect the level of inequality, and tends to under-
estimate the overall inequality in cities. In Shanghai, it is es-
timated that salary-based income accounts for only 65 per-
cent of the city’s total income, whilst 25 percent is drawn
from housing subsidies, healthcare, and education, and 10
percent from irregular or illegal economic benefits. (46) Unfor-
tunately, the estimation of this portion of income is beyond
most current surveys and official statistics, as a unified system
monitoring personal income and tax is unavailable. Our
analysis only focuses on measurable monetary inequality.
Similarly, we were unable to capture any “grey income” and
non-monetary subsidiaries from employers or administrative
institutions, as such information is difficult to collect and un-
reliable. Taking “grey income” and non-monetary sub-
sidiaries into consideration, one could expect even greater in-
equality in urban China. The income gaps between urban lo-
cals and rural migrants would almost certainly be greater.Concluding  remarks
In the pre-reform era, Chinese urban society was essentially
egalitarian, and differentials between social groups and sec-
tors were insignificant. For the majority of urban residents,
career mobility was restricted, but jobs were always allocated
by local administrative authorities and the jobs tended to be
largely secure. Although everyone’s salary was low, various
forms of social welfare and services were assured, in most of
cases free of charge. The major divide in the pre-reform era,
however, was between the rural and urban areas, described
by some scholars as the Great Wall of Chinese society. (47)
The great majority of rural residents were entitled to none of
these benefits and were tied to their farmland. Poverty,
sometimes absolute poverty, prevailed in many rural areas,
but only affected a small proportion of urban residents. This
was largely due to the Chinese government’s urban-centred
development orientation in the first three decades after the
founding of the People’s Republic. The hukou system,
which was first implemented in late 1950s, restricted labour
mobility, especially mobility from the rural to urban areas. (48)
In the decades after reform, with gradual relaxation of the
hukou policy and rapid development of the market-oriented
economy, the country has seen an increasing number of mi-
grants from both rural and urban areas, mostly moving to-
ward large cities and coastal areas in search of better job op-
portunities and better income. The massive influx of rural-
urban migrants has satisfied the demand for cheap labour in
cities and fuelled three decades of rapid economic growth in
a low-wage economy. In addition to attracting rural migrants,
large urban centres, mainly located in the Pearl and Yangtze
River deltas and the Beijing-Tianjin economic nexus, also at-
tracted millions of urban migrants hunting for opportunities
unavailable in their smaller hometown cities. 
A newly built village in the outskirt 
of Tianjin where rural residents 
were transformed to urban residents, 2007. © Fei Guo
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47. Feng Wang, “The Breakdown of a Great Wall: Recent Changes in Household Registration
System in China,” in Thomas Scharping (ed.), Floating Population and Migration in
China: The Impacts of Economic Reforms, Hamburg, Institute of Asian Studies, 1997.
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A village in the outskirt of Tianjin where cheap rental
accommodation is available to rural migrants, 2007.
© Fei Guo
Labour Market Disparity, Poverty, and Inequality in Urban China
It is against this background that the results of this paper can
be better understood. The economic history of many coun-
tries implies that serious urban poverty and significant in-
equality need to be frequently monitored in developing
economies during the process of ideological transition, eco-
nomic takeoff, and rapid urbanisation. This is not unique to
China. The results of the present study, based on data col-
lected from four of the most populated and developed cities
in China, suggest that there are clear disparities in the
labour market in large Chinese cities in terms of the means
for obtaining jobs and the types of employment among urban
residents, urban migrants, and rural migrants. Local urban
residents, migrants from other cities, and migrants from the
countryside tend to enjoy clearly different levels of public as-
sistance in job searches. Migrants from the countryside tend
to receive the least public assistance and tend to rely prima-
rily on family members and friends for job searches. The re-
sults also indicate clear disparities in terms of the employ-
ment structure of the three groups; migrants from other cities
tend to be much better off than migrants from the country-
side in terms of types of employment. The results of this
study also suggest that urban poverty and inequality in these
cities were severe, with 6 to 17 percent of the total urban
population living in poverty, depending on the definition of
poverty lines, and that rural migrants were particularly af-
fected. It is safe to say that rural migrants make up a signifi-
cant component of the urban poor in large Chinese cities.
However, official poverty relief programs in many cities only
cover as little as 0.5 percent or no more than 2.8 percent of
the poor, and exclude migrants, who are not registered in the
local hukou system of the cities. The challenge is whether
city authorities are willing or able to take rural migrants into
consideration in their fight against urban poverty. In public
debates and scholarly research, attention has often been fo-
cused on poverty in the rural areas and the inequality be-
tween rural and urban areas. There has been inadequate at-
tention to urban poverty and inequality within various popu-
lation groups within cities. The results of this paper strongly
suggest that poverty and economic inequality are two impor-
tant issues in urban China that deserve better understanding
and more support from public resources. The finding that in-
equality among rural migrants as a group was less significant
than among the other two groups does not necessarily mean
that the issue is less severe, but rather that rural migrants as
a group tend to be located at the bottom of the income spec-
trum. 
This paper has addressed some important issues related to
urban poverty and income inequality in large Chinese cities.
It has also raised a number of questions that warrant further
study: for example, labour market segmentation as a deter-
minant of wage levels, and the social welfare and security
patterns for different hukou holders. The authors of this
paper plan to carry out another study on the determinants
for labour market disparities and income inequality using
hourly wage-based poverty incidence and probability mod-
els. Empirical studies on social security entitlements and wel-
fare program participation among urban local residents, mi-
grants from other cities, and migrants from the countryside
could also contribute to our understanding of poverty and in-
equality in large Chinese cities. In addition, more qualitative
studies could enhance our understanding of the complex
causes of poverty and inequality, and their consequences to
families and communities. •
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Glossary
danwei 單位
guoyou qiye gaige 國有企業改革
xiagang gongren 下崗工人
yuan 圓
hukou 戶口
liudong renkou 流動人口
nongmin gong 農民工
juweihui 居委會
dibao 低保
getihu 個體戶
